Samuel James...And the Philosopher's Blog
Friday, August 12, 2011
Riot and revelry
The scenes are not unlike something out of a Batman film. Uncontrolled, uncontained, and unfeeling hordes of mob youth are ransacking Britain. Our first reaction must always be prayerful concern for the safety of a nation, and a thirst for justice to those who prey on the defenseless. What kind of reflective value might this deplorable spectacle contain?
I think the most helpful lesson is the destruction of delusion. Human progress is talked of sometimes like an unstoppable force of quasi-metaphysical destiny. Such abstraction does not survive long in the face of cruelty and malice like that which is happening in London. The innate goodness of man must be challenged whenever we see such widespread debauchery, not because we arrogantly proclaim ourselves better, but because we recognize there is little fundamental difference between oppressor and oppressed. Moral equivalency? Hardly; merely a sensible persuasion that the youth mobs in Tottenham are not terrorist trainees or religious fundamentalist soldiers. They are all too common children.
Into the empty revelry of Emerson and the Romantics, Christianity inserts a resounding alarm of reality. Man will never reach the existential potential of secular humanism, and this not because he is uneducated but because he is a sinner. The scenes from the UK are a brutal wake up call to the sleepy optimism of Western philosophy. It has become politically anathema to use the old word "brutes" to refer to morally or socially bankrupt persons; but what else can you call the mob in the video? This is not the work of victims who have been failed by a broken class structure; it is the work of innately evil hearts.
Christianity, and only Christianity, provides a serious worldview for what we are seeing. Anything else will lapse either into nihilism or hypocrisy, and will not buffer the cause of justice. The world is broken, and Christ, not the school board or government or scientist, goes forth into the brokenness to seek and to save that which is lost.
Interesting article from the Financial Times: "Britain Burns the Color of 'A Clockwork Orange'"
Labels:
Christianity,
ethics,
London
Saturday, August 6, 2011
Sexual ethics and autonomy
Sexual ethics hinges on one question: Is man autonomous?
What you believe about sexual ethics will depend entirely upon your answer to that question. Moral autonomy means that man is accountable only to himself for his actions. A more popular version of this is to say that man is accountable to himself and to society; but it's worth noting that in the area of sexual ethics, the societal accountability factor diminishes substantially.
The best way to see that this is the case is to consider that, for a great deal of people, the only ethical question of relevance in their sexuality is the question of mutual consent. If the other person consents willingly, the ethical demand of sexual activity has been accomplished, and everything subsequent is merely a reflection of an autonomous human will.
The Scriptures make a forthright assertion about humans that is supremely relevant to this question. The Bible says that you "are not your own," and have been bought at a price. The Apostle seems to anticipate the logical connection between the assertion of autonomy and sexual morality, because immediately after he says "Therefore honor God with your bodies." In other words, for Paul, sexual morality is not merely a question of prudery or altruism. It is about rendering to God's the things that are God's.
Sexual ethics is ultimately absurd unless we presume that man is not, in fact, the measure of all things. Even the ethic of mutual consent breaks down when buffered by nothing better than itself. Any kind of sanity to be found in an age of sexual nihilism cannot presume a moral autonomy for the person. The great mystery of Creation is that in surrendering our autonomy we receive a true freedom whose end is life and peace.
What you believe about sexual ethics will depend entirely upon your answer to that question. Moral autonomy means that man is accountable only to himself for his actions. A more popular version of this is to say that man is accountable to himself and to society; but it's worth noting that in the area of sexual ethics, the societal accountability factor diminishes substantially.
The best way to see that this is the case is to consider that, for a great deal of people, the only ethical question of relevance in their sexuality is the question of mutual consent. If the other person consents willingly, the ethical demand of sexual activity has been accomplished, and everything subsequent is merely a reflection of an autonomous human will.
The Scriptures make a forthright assertion about humans that is supremely relevant to this question. The Bible says that you "are not your own," and have been bought at a price. The Apostle seems to anticipate the logical connection between the assertion of autonomy and sexual morality, because immediately after he says "Therefore honor God with your bodies." In other words, for Paul, sexual morality is not merely a question of prudery or altruism. It is about rendering to God's the things that are God's.
Sexual ethics is ultimately absurd unless we presume that man is not, in fact, the measure of all things. Even the ethic of mutual consent breaks down when buffered by nothing better than itself. Any kind of sanity to be found in an age of sexual nihilism cannot presume a moral autonomy for the person. The great mystery of Creation is that in surrendering our autonomy we receive a true freedom whose end is life and peace.
Labels:
Christianity,
ethics,
sex
Thursday, August 4, 2011
Worldview 101
I don't intend for this blog to be reactionary or to seek out things I don't agree with on the web. First it's just a waste of time, and secondly the internet plays host to much more nonsense that doesn't deserve a reply than it does to serious intellectual discourse. But I saw the following quote on a blog and it's so fundamentally wrong, and in the area of study I call my own, that I have to address it.
Dianne Anderson, an evangelical feminist, is unhappy with Albert Mohler over his views on biblical manhood. I won't even touch that debate, rather I want to respond to this point made by Anderson (and attributed by her to a professor):
There is no such thing as a “worldview.”
Lest I overwhelm myself with the amount of content begging correction here, let me take her points line by line:
1. The Definition of Worldview
Her definition of worldview indicates that worldview is a totally consistent and totally objectified intellectual position that, apart from life, lives in abstraction. Where she (or her professor) obtained this definition is a baffling mystery, because in my 5 years or so in philosophical education I have never once encoutered this definition for what worldview is. Ronald Nash, one of the most respected Christian philosophers of the last 30 years, defines worldview simply as "the sum total of the answers one gives to life's biggest questions." (Life's Ultimate Questions) There is no pretense in Christian worldview studies to complete objectivity or consistency; in fact, I am unaware of any serious philosophical treatise (religious or no) published in the last 100 years that would give this kind of definition to Weltanschauung.
Christian philosophy not only affirms the place of experience in our intellectual development; it is the only rational placement for it. A worldview is developed through experiences and "intellectual orientation" that do not always intersect but neither are they completely parallel. To say that an affirmation and exhortation to Christian worldview denigrates our experiences or claims perfect objectivity is laughable in the extreme.
2. The effect of life experiences on one's worldview
Anderson begins to speak out of both sides of her mouth here. She says that life experiences will always "color" our worldviews, and of course that is correct. But then she implies that experiences have a defining effect on our worldviews, such that a person's experiences must necessarily produce a worldview consistent with those experiences. What exactly does her analogy represent? Yes, obviously, if she had been raised in a Hindu household, much of her intellectual make up would be different. But how does this support her insinuation of a causative relationship between experiences and beliefs? Maybe she means to imply that her religious sensibilites would be more naturally inclusivistic of Hindu theology were she to have family members who embraced it. Sure, this might be true of her, but it is also not true of many others. The appeal to analogy here fails.
3. The possibility of biblical worldview
Her conclusion is understandably false given her false premises. She insists that an appeal to a biblical worldview is "dishonest" because it gives the impression of unified meaning of Scripture. Here, Ms. Anderson is letting her own philosophical commitments show. Her support for this argument is nothing more than an appeal to the various disagreements amongst Christians about the meaning of Scripture. "See, Christians disagree! A biblical worldview is not possible and doesn't exist!" This is a non-sequitur magnum opus. Various streams of biblical interpretation do not exist as evidence against a unified worldview of Scripture any more than the existence of many world religious exist as evidence against the exclusive claims of Christ. And at any rate, Ms. Anderson seems to be defining "biblical" in a very narrow and reductionist way. Surely she would grant the possibility of a core creedal essence of Christianity, one that could form the basis of worldviews and opinions of many different people from different traditions.
The effort to form a biblical worldview is an effort to see life the way that God, as revealed in Scripture, sees it. When Christ prays for his disciples in the upper room he does not only refer to God's word as true, but sets an ontological value on the word itself: "Thy word IS truth." The Bible, evangelicals believe, is God's word to man. This word is not only true, in the sense that the things that is says should be believed and are correct; but the word is truth itself, truth that will be foundational to the truths we will discover in the world and in ourselves. As Francis Schaeffer famously said, the Bible is "true truth." A biblical worldview is well worth the time and serious thinking it requires, for it richly rewards in a vision of reality afforded us only by the Maker and Master of the cosmos.
Dianne Anderson, an evangelical feminist, is unhappy with Albert Mohler over his views on biblical manhood. I won't even touch that debate, rather I want to respond to this point made by Anderson (and attributed by her to a professor):
There is no such thing as a “worldview.”
“Worldview” implies that there are different lenses from which you can view the world, that there is some way that you can be entirely and completely objective and consistent in how you develop a life philosophy apart from your lived experience. It implies that there are pairs of glasses you can use to switch out ways you view the world.
That is fundamentally flawed. You cannot separate yourself from your experience, and that lived experience will ALWAYS color the way you view the world. So for me, the phrase “worldview maturity” is entirely meaningless. If, for example, I was raised in India in a Hindu household, and then converted to Christianity, my “worldview maturity” would still look quite different from Mohler’s born and bred American Christianity.
To imply that there is one consistent “Biblical” worldview is intellectually dishonest – there is no such thing. Even within American Christianity, there are massive disagreements (this being a prime example). Additionally, Mohler seems to be thinking in an us vs. them mentality, including the action of apologetics in a “biblical worldview,” which neglects the idea that not everyone is good at apologetics. (emphasis original)
Lest I overwhelm myself with the amount of content begging correction here, let me take her points line by line:
1. The Definition of Worldview
Her definition of worldview indicates that worldview is a totally consistent and totally objectified intellectual position that, apart from life, lives in abstraction. Where she (or her professor) obtained this definition is a baffling mystery, because in my 5 years or so in philosophical education I have never once encoutered this definition for what worldview is. Ronald Nash, one of the most respected Christian philosophers of the last 30 years, defines worldview simply as "the sum total of the answers one gives to life's biggest questions." (Life's Ultimate Questions) There is no pretense in Christian worldview studies to complete objectivity or consistency; in fact, I am unaware of any serious philosophical treatise (religious or no) published in the last 100 years that would give this kind of definition to Weltanschauung.
Christian philosophy not only affirms the place of experience in our intellectual development; it is the only rational placement for it. A worldview is developed through experiences and "intellectual orientation" that do not always intersect but neither are they completely parallel. To say that an affirmation and exhortation to Christian worldview denigrates our experiences or claims perfect objectivity is laughable in the extreme.
2. The effect of life experiences on one's worldview
Anderson begins to speak out of both sides of her mouth here. She says that life experiences will always "color" our worldviews, and of course that is correct. But then she implies that experiences have a defining effect on our worldviews, such that a person's experiences must necessarily produce a worldview consistent with those experiences. What exactly does her analogy represent? Yes, obviously, if she had been raised in a Hindu household, much of her intellectual make up would be different. But how does this support her insinuation of a causative relationship between experiences and beliefs? Maybe she means to imply that her religious sensibilites would be more naturally inclusivistic of Hindu theology were she to have family members who embraced it. Sure, this might be true of her, but it is also not true of many others. The appeal to analogy here fails.
3. The possibility of biblical worldview
Her conclusion is understandably false given her false premises. She insists that an appeal to a biblical worldview is "dishonest" because it gives the impression of unified meaning of Scripture. Here, Ms. Anderson is letting her own philosophical commitments show. Her support for this argument is nothing more than an appeal to the various disagreements amongst Christians about the meaning of Scripture. "See, Christians disagree! A biblical worldview is not possible and doesn't exist!" This is a non-sequitur magnum opus. Various streams of biblical interpretation do not exist as evidence against a unified worldview of Scripture any more than the existence of many world religious exist as evidence against the exclusive claims of Christ. And at any rate, Ms. Anderson seems to be defining "biblical" in a very narrow and reductionist way. Surely she would grant the possibility of a core creedal essence of Christianity, one that could form the basis of worldviews and opinions of many different people from different traditions.
The effort to form a biblical worldview is an effort to see life the way that God, as revealed in Scripture, sees it. When Christ prays for his disciples in the upper room he does not only refer to God's word as true, but sets an ontological value on the word itself: "Thy word IS truth." The Bible, evangelicals believe, is God's word to man. This word is not only true, in the sense that the things that is says should be believed and are correct; but the word is truth itself, truth that will be foundational to the truths we will discover in the world and in ourselves. As Francis Schaeffer famously said, the Bible is "true truth." A biblical worldview is well worth the time and serious thinking it requires, for it richly rewards in a vision of reality afforded us only by the Maker and Master of the cosmos.
Labels:
Christianity,
philosophy,
worldview
Monday, August 1, 2011
The moral imperative of right belief
The question "Can one be good without God?" is meaningful only if we presume a dichotomy between our morality and our convictions. From the omnipresence of the question I can only assume that many people, knowingly or no, have assumed such a dichotomy. For the Christian though (and for anyone who takes belief seriously), there can be no such assumption. Nothing is more fundamentally ethical than what we believe about God.
Part of the reason I think this assumption has gained so much traction is that, particularly in scientific studies, individual religious belief has been viewed as deterministic. A person who is reared in a religious home will develop convictions (at least in their childhood) that are in keeping with those in the home. This is less a reflection of the child's sense of the rightness of the beliefs and more of a simple conformity to what the child knows and trusts. Obviously this is true and we see it every day. The more interesting question is whether, as a human grows intellectually and emotionally, this paradigm for belief-forming ever changes.
To be clear, the modern psychology educators are not totally unified on this question. But there seems to be a trajectory towards an answer of "no." Philosophers and scientists such as Pascal Boyer, Robert Hinde, and Michael Shermer have all written on the human psyche's need for pattern and community, needs that are met in religious contexts. In other words, to Boyer and Hinde and Shermer, religion may present itself as a collection of truth claims, but this is mainly a facade; religion is merely anthropological reality.
I wrote on this subject for a class on epistemology the previous semester. Space does not allow me to rehash on the reasons I believe that these philosophers are incorrect. Suffice to say that I believe this attitude towards religion is a key player in the development of the assumption of the moral neutrality of religious belief (or nonbelief). But let us put the idea on trial. Is religious conviction ethical? I submit that what a person believes about metaphysics (here meaning God(s), eternity, meaning, etc) is not only inherently ethical, but that it is a supreme ethical issue.
To disbelieve the truth is immoral. This is not necessarily the same as saying that all incorrect beliefs have the same immoral causes. A person might know what is real but deny it for some sort of personal gain; a second person might believe that what the first person told them is true because he trusts him and there no visible reason to doubt. Being "duped" is an unfortunate consequence of not being omniscient. But when a person who has been tricked receives the true state of things, does she then have a moral obligation to believe it? Does truth deserve belief by merit of its being truth?
My answer is yes. It matters in an ethical sense whether or not we believe the truth. Not every true statement carries with it the same ethical weight. It might not make a great difference whether I believe it will rain in New Orleans tomorrow or not. Might it make more of a difference if I refuse to believe that it has rained in New Orleans? When the locals tell me it has, when the weather information informs me so, when I have it on reliable sources that it has and only my intuition and desires to tell me otherwise--does it matter what I believe in that moment? Yes it does. It reflects on my love of truth. It reflects on my honesty, on my integrity.
C.S. Lewis said no honest man will believe Christianity if he thinks it says the wrong things, no matter if he finds Christianity helpful or not. If Christianity helps us to live a useful or easy or even altruistic life, but in fact the universe is more like the atheists say than what Christianity says, our obligation is to believe the truth. Likewise, if we find Christianity to be the case, we must believe whether or not we find it useful or easy or altruistic.
Part of the reason I think this assumption has gained so much traction is that, particularly in scientific studies, individual religious belief has been viewed as deterministic. A person who is reared in a religious home will develop convictions (at least in their childhood) that are in keeping with those in the home. This is less a reflection of the child's sense of the rightness of the beliefs and more of a simple conformity to what the child knows and trusts. Obviously this is true and we see it every day. The more interesting question is whether, as a human grows intellectually and emotionally, this paradigm for belief-forming ever changes.
To be clear, the modern psychology educators are not totally unified on this question. But there seems to be a trajectory towards an answer of "no." Philosophers and scientists such as Pascal Boyer, Robert Hinde, and Michael Shermer have all written on the human psyche's need for pattern and community, needs that are met in religious contexts. In other words, to Boyer and Hinde and Shermer, religion may present itself as a collection of truth claims, but this is mainly a facade; religion is merely anthropological reality.
I wrote on this subject for a class on epistemology the previous semester. Space does not allow me to rehash on the reasons I believe that these philosophers are incorrect. Suffice to say that I believe this attitude towards religion is a key player in the development of the assumption of the moral neutrality of religious belief (or nonbelief). But let us put the idea on trial. Is religious conviction ethical? I submit that what a person believes about metaphysics (here meaning God(s), eternity, meaning, etc) is not only inherently ethical, but that it is a supreme ethical issue.
To disbelieve the truth is immoral. This is not necessarily the same as saying that all incorrect beliefs have the same immoral causes. A person might know what is real but deny it for some sort of personal gain; a second person might believe that what the first person told them is true because he trusts him and there no visible reason to doubt. Being "duped" is an unfortunate consequence of not being omniscient. But when a person who has been tricked receives the true state of things, does she then have a moral obligation to believe it? Does truth deserve belief by merit of its being truth?
My answer is yes. It matters in an ethical sense whether or not we believe the truth. Not every true statement carries with it the same ethical weight. It might not make a great difference whether I believe it will rain in New Orleans tomorrow or not. Might it make more of a difference if I refuse to believe that it has rained in New Orleans? When the locals tell me it has, when the weather information informs me so, when I have it on reliable sources that it has and only my intuition and desires to tell me otherwise--does it matter what I believe in that moment? Yes it does. It reflects on my love of truth. It reflects on my honesty, on my integrity.
C.S. Lewis said no honest man will believe Christianity if he thinks it says the wrong things, no matter if he finds Christianity helpful or not. If Christianity helps us to live a useful or easy or even altruistic life, but in fact the universe is more like the atheists say than what Christianity says, our obligation is to believe the truth. Likewise, if we find Christianity to be the case, we must believe whether or not we find it useful or easy or altruistic.
Labels:
atheism,
Christianity,
ethics
Sunday, July 31, 2011
Auteur theory and divine image
The auteur theory states that directors are reflected in the films they direct. In other words, a film reflects a part of the director in some way. The name "auteur theory" is new (introduced formally by French director Francois Traffaut) but the concept is old and well understood to anyone who has studied literature, art, music, or film.
Can we find a reason why artists are reflected in their art? The anthropology of Scripture offers one. In the book of Genesis we are told that when God created man, He created man "in his image." The phrase is significant because it is said of no other part of nature. The author of Genesis is explicit that the creation of Man according to the divine image is the basis for the investment of authority and dominion over the earth. The divine image is what makes Man man.
Theologians of church history have understood that man's creative potential (his "reason") is one of the highest faculties of his existence. Reason is essentially the ability to create connections between abstractions. Man's reason is his creative power, his power over ideas. Now, if the culimination of the divine image is man, and the highest mark of this image is creative potential, it stands to reason that man is fundamentally creative and that the reason for this is that God is creative. In other words, God's creative work of man reflects himself.
God is the First Auteur. Since the divine image man is able to, like God, create in a definite image. We are able to see our Selves in the things we create, because this is how we were created. A biblical anthropology is the only philosophically satisfying explanation for man's reflexive creativity. As man images God, so art images man.
Can we find a reason why artists are reflected in their art? The anthropology of Scripture offers one. In the book of Genesis we are told that when God created man, He created man "in his image." The phrase is significant because it is said of no other part of nature. The author of Genesis is explicit that the creation of Man according to the divine image is the basis for the investment of authority and dominion over the earth. The divine image is what makes Man man.
Theologians of church history have understood that man's creative potential (his "reason") is one of the highest faculties of his existence. Reason is essentially the ability to create connections between abstractions. Man's reason is his creative power, his power over ideas. Now, if the culimination of the divine image is man, and the highest mark of this image is creative potential, it stands to reason that man is fundamentally creative and that the reason for this is that God is creative. In other words, God's creative work of man reflects himself.
God is the First Auteur. Since the divine image man is able to, like God, create in a definite image. We are able to see our Selves in the things we create, because this is how we were created. A biblical anthropology is the only philosophically satisfying explanation for man's reflexive creativity. As man images God, so art images man.
Labels:
philosophy,
theology
Saturday, July 30, 2011
The sorceror's stoning
Michael O' Brien, a Catholic intellectual and writer, has offered what is probably one of the more thoughtful and systematic criticisms of the Harry Potter books available. Here's one of the more relevant quotes from a recent interview with Lifesite News:
O'Brien's comments are not without some ground and even some justification. Particularly in the final two books, the moral maze of the Harry Potter narrative becomes much more complicated. There are legitimate concerns about what Rowling has invested in her story. Unfortunately, O'Brien's comments about the witchcraft of the book do little to help his audience understand this.
O'Brien, like many Potter critics I've read and spoken to, seems unable to articulate a serious difference between the magical world of Rowling and that of Tolkien (whom he cites with admiration). As has been pointed out many times, both Tolkien and C.S. Lewis regularly depicted magic in positive, morally constructive contexts. The central hero of the Lord of the Rings books is Gandalf, the wizard, whose own resurrection after the battle with the "demon" Balrog is a key moment in the series. The similarities between Gandalf and Dumbledore, the corresponding hero of the Harry Potter books, are striking enough to inspire a good deal of conversation on the legacy of Tolkien's fantasy.
Contrary to how O'Brien portrays it, the "moral neutrality" of the magic in the Harry Potter universe is not an endorsement of demonic activity, but a narrative device to establish a parallel universe. Similar to George Lucas's "force," magic, in Rowling's work, is simply a part of nature and the cosmos, a part that can be utilized to serve the desires of those born sensitive to it. This is the great difference between the witcraft condemned in Scripture, and the magic present in fairy tales. In the Scriptures, witchcraft is understood a working of the supernatural that does not invoke the power of Yahweh but the power of evil spirits. In fairy stories, magic usually is portrayed a part of the universe, no more remarkable to those aware of it than the laws of mathematics or physics.
O'Brien's misunderstanding of this is elemental to most of his concerns about the books. In my opinion, it's simply a matter of misread literature. Though there are moral complexities that call for attention in the Potter books (as well as in other fairy stories), the use of magic is not one that is difficult to understand or assimilate.
...J.K. Rowling is a talented storyteller, but she has also used the style and technique of modern television and cinema media, which seizes the imagination by pummelling it, bombarding it with powerful stimuli, in a rapid pace, with plenty of emotional rewards. So, in the matter of style alone she has made a major change in the way stories are told, and how they are read.
Most important, she has taken the paganization of children’s culture to the next step, in which sorcery and witchcraft—traditionally allied with supernatural evil—is now presented as morally neutral. In the hands of “nice” people it’s an instrument for good. In the hands of not-nice people it’s an instrument for evil. She has shifted the battle lines between good and evil, which can have a disorienting effect, especially on the young who are in the stage of formation.
Regardless of how wildly imaginative it may be, good fantasy points us towards ultimate reality, “the moral order of the universe” as J.R.R. Tolkien called it. Corrupt fantasy points us, or forms us, in a consciousness that can lead to thinking that evil is good and good is evil. In the worst case, this may have long range effects, prompting the reader intuitively, subconsciously, to do evil while thinking they’re doing good.
O'Brien's comments are not without some ground and even some justification. Particularly in the final two books, the moral maze of the Harry Potter narrative becomes much more complicated. There are legitimate concerns about what Rowling has invested in her story. Unfortunately, O'Brien's comments about the witchcraft of the book do little to help his audience understand this.
O'Brien, like many Potter critics I've read and spoken to, seems unable to articulate a serious difference between the magical world of Rowling and that of Tolkien (whom he cites with admiration). As has been pointed out many times, both Tolkien and C.S. Lewis regularly depicted magic in positive, morally constructive contexts. The central hero of the Lord of the Rings books is Gandalf, the wizard, whose own resurrection after the battle with the "demon" Balrog is a key moment in the series. The similarities between Gandalf and Dumbledore, the corresponding hero of the Harry Potter books, are striking enough to inspire a good deal of conversation on the legacy of Tolkien's fantasy.
Contrary to how O'Brien portrays it, the "moral neutrality" of the magic in the Harry Potter universe is not an endorsement of demonic activity, but a narrative device to establish a parallel universe. Similar to George Lucas's "force," magic, in Rowling's work, is simply a part of nature and the cosmos, a part that can be utilized to serve the desires of those born sensitive to it. This is the great difference between the witcraft condemned in Scripture, and the magic present in fairy tales. In the Scriptures, witchcraft is understood a working of the supernatural that does not invoke the power of Yahweh but the power of evil spirits. In fairy stories, magic usually is portrayed a part of the universe, no more remarkable to those aware of it than the laws of mathematics or physics.
O'Brien's misunderstanding of this is elemental to most of his concerns about the books. In my opinion, it's simply a matter of misread literature. Though there are moral complexities that call for attention in the Potter books (as well as in other fairy stories), the use of magic is not one that is difficult to understand or assimilate.
Labels:
literature
Thursday, July 28, 2011
Reel Spirituality
Here's a good resource for anyone who loves film and would think about the medium from a Christian perspective. Robert Johnston has put together a solid resource that discusses the particulars of the craft, the power and potential of film narrative, and a Christian engagement with film. In addition to the helpful analysis of filmmaking, Johnston discusses many different culturally significant movies and the outstanding elements of them. It's definitely a must read for any Christians interested in film as a profession and as an artistic medium.
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